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Chapter pages in book: (p. 14 - 24)rent assets and short-term debt, given the inflated financial stru
ture of 1920, was desirable from the standpoint of the long-n
prosperity of the whole economy; and as to whether business entc
prise could have avoided participating so extensively in the postw;
accumulation of inventory, of current debt, and of forward cot
mitments to buy and sell. Business concerns were, of course, folio'
ing long-established practices of financing current operations, ar
their policies were formulated by executives whose experience 'di
not embrace a single period of drastic price deflation. Furthermor
the business contraction and price deflation of 1929-21 was moi
than a crisis of commitments, inventory and current debt; in
sponsible cancellation of orders and the heavy liquidation of ii
ventory and business debt seem mainly to have made the contra
tion more severe. Nevertheless, it was unfortunate that the
environment induced such widespread. disregard of financial pri
dence.
In drawing general conclusions from this paper, it should
borne in mind that only a limited segment of the economy is dea
with here, and only a few of the factors involved. Many elemen
other than those associated with the financing of manufacturin
and trade enterprise determined the course of the war period finai
cial expansion, and many other elements, international as well
domestic, operated to bring about the postwar liquidation. TF
difficulties that beset any effort to obtain a completely comprehei
sive view are so great, however, that use must be made of invest
gations of more limited scope. Only by comparing the views of
number of different observers will it be possible to develop tli
entire record of World War I and absorb fully the economic lessot
of that period.
FINANCING TENDENCIES, WORLD WAR II —
APRELIMINARY COMPARISON
Compared with the presentconflict, World War I was
Even in igi8, the year of greatest effort, probably only a little moi
than a fifth of the national product was devoted to war.
output made no serious inroads on civilian supplies untiF the secon
half of igi8, and by the end of that year hostilities had ceased an
demobilization was in full swing. But in i941, before the counti
was directly involved in World War II, one-tenth of the nation
14roduct was absorbed by military outlays; in 1942wartook one-
rird of the national product, and in 1943itwill take at least one-
ilf.3 The business financing problems precipitated by this greater
)ncentration of effort upon war needs, while they find some paral-
is in World War I experience, are much more complex and diffi-
ilt than the ones which arose in the earlier period.
At the outbreak of World War II the pattern of business debt
nong manufacturing and trade companies, in relation to size of
iterprise, was similar to that at the outbreak of World War I.
roadly speaking, equity was high and debt was low for large cor-
)rations and ve.ry small corporations, the highest ratios of debt
equity occurring in the medium and small enterprise classes; an
[ception was wholesale trade; where the debt ratio rose with size.
ut economic changes that occurred between 1914and1939 had
tered the significance of the pattern. First, the composition of
Lanufacturing and trade was considerably different in terms of ac-
vities, as a result of the integration of business processes, of the
:owth in the importance of durable goods, and of other changes
ithestructure of the economy. Second, the average size of enter-
rises was greater, and a slightly greater proportion of enterprises,
irtly because of the many consolidations and mergers of the
os, were in the large-size-high-equity category, which includes
Lose with total assets in excess ofmillion;in consequence, for
Lanufacturing and trade as a whole, the relative importance of debt
ifinancialstructure had declined.4
Also the financial expansion that has taken place in manufactur-
and trade enterprise since the beginning of World War II re-
mbles, in several important respects, what occurred during the
Torld War I period. Sales of large corporations (particularly in
Lanufacturing) have increased more than those of medium and
nall-size companies (except for smaller companies whose products
'e essential to, the war effort, such as aircraft and machine tools).
sset investment, especially of large corporations in strategic in.
'istries, has once more been greatly accentuated. Current assets of
4ilwn Gilbert and George Jaszi, "National Income and National Product in 1942,"
rveyof Current Business (March '943) pp. 10-19.
rhesegeneral observations are drawn from an unpublished study by Sidney S.
exander, Changes in the Financial Structure of American Business Enterprise, 1900-
NationalBureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program (ms. 1943).
15manufacturing and trade —cash,marketable securities, receivabl
and inventory —haveagain expanded in relation to total assets, ar
current debt too has risen.5
But there are also conspicuous differences between the two w:
period expansipns. Because of the increased mechanization of ma
emwarfare the need for specialized productive plant is immeasu
ably greater in World War II than it was in World War I; and ii
loss of shipping facilities and of foreign sources of supply —oft:
and rubber, for example —hasgreatly extended the number ar
variety of goods that must be produced. Much of the industri
plant capacity, needed for the present war has had to be newly co
structed. At the end of 1939thetotal book value of plant and equi
ment in all manufacturing industry, net of accrued depreciatio
amounted to about $23billion;by mid-1943 almost $20 billic
of new plant capacity for war production was either finished or
process of construction,6 substantially over half of which was in i
dustries whose facilities may have some peacetime application.
Approximately 8o percent of this new construction has be
publicly financed, either under Emergency Plant Facilities Co
tracts of the Army, the Navy or the Maritime Commission, or I
the Defense Plant Corporation, the Reconstruction Finance Cc
poration,7 or the British government. In comparison with a figu'
of about billionof publicly financed additions to industri
plant made during the present war, the amount so spent durii
World War I probably did not exceed million,8 and the bu
of this investment was for production of munitions and ships. F
the most part the financing of World War I addijions to manufa
5SeeRoy A. Foulke, Our Critical Wealth in Inventories, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (Ni
York 1942)pp.37-39 and 52-71, whichgives a significant summary report of finai
ing tendencies in 70linesof business activity (42manufacturing, wholesalinga
7 retailing) for the years 1937-41.
6 Basedon War Production Board press release, June 1943.
7 Asof November i,1942, theReconstruction Finance Corporation and itssu
sidiaries had financed or contracted to finance the construction, equipment or exp2
sion of 1,337 plants for the production of war materiel, the total cost being in exc
of $8.3 billion.
8LowellJ. Chawner, "Capital Expenditures for Manufacturing Plant and Equipme:
1915to1940,"Surveyof Current Business (March 1941)p.io, gives a figure of
million total publicly financed additions to manufacturing facilities,1917-19.2
thoughinformation is not available, it appears that some additional facilities w
financed by Allied governments, 1915-17.
'6uring capacity was effected through industrial channels without
lirect participation by the Federal government in the risks of own-
and such additions were on a moderate scale in comparison
vith those in the present war. Thus there was no serjous legacy of
plant and facilities to be disposed of by dis-
nantlement and scrap, by public operation, by outright or instal-
nent sale to interests, or by lease.
What differences World War II plant expansion may make in
)ostwar property expenditures cannot be foreseen, •but they are
timost sure to be relatively large, as they were in the first postwar
)eriod, because of heavy reconversion and replacement outlays.
Property expansion in trade during World War II has probably
een more severely curtailed than during World War I.
With the wartime increase in consumer incomes, retail and
wholesale trade lines have prospered in terms of sales during World
War II, as they did in World War I. But although the growth of
:rade inventory was stimulated in both war expansions, in World
War II the sharp curtailment of production of civilian supplies has
ibruptly checked the increase in trade inventory and has
in depletion of accumulated stocks in spite of the imposition
a general price ceiling, and the introduction of consumer ration-
ing. Thus while trade concerns generally were well stocked in No-
vember 1918,theshelves and warehouses of many such enterprises
may be almost empty at the end of World War II. As for manufac-
turing industry, durable and non-durable goods producers appear to
have increased their dollar inventory at approximately the same
rate during World War I, but during the war the rate of
inventory growth of durable goods producers greatly exceeded
that of non-durable goods manufacturers.
Throughout World War I the risks of current inventory accu-
mulation were to a large extent a primary responsibility of private
enterprise, though in war production there were contract cancella-
tion clauses that provided compensation for the purchase of mate-
rials needed in filling orders for war supplies. During World War
[I, on the other hand, special public financing agencies, mainly
;ubsidiaries of the RFC, have undertaken to share in risks attendant
inventory accumulation for war output: by agreeing to purchase
inventories for prospective war contractors, whether prime or sub-
:ontractors, in advance of visible sales to public agencies; and also
'7by direct acquisition of inventory of strategic supplies, holding am
selling it as needed. In addition, these agencies have undertaken ti
finance inventory immobilized by rationing or other restriction5
or have committed themselves to purchase it. No estimate of th
total World War II participation by public agencies in the risks o
inventory accumulation is possible, but fragmentary informatioi
indicates that in manufacturing alone it may have amounted to a
much as a fifth of total inventory by the beginning of 1943.
InWorld War I, manufacturing and trade companies commoni'
valued inventory by methods that approximated the first-in, first-ou
("fifo") principle, which operated in a period of rising price
to inflate book profits, and in a period of falling prices to accentu
ate book losses. Realization of this fact led a few
concerns to introduce, during the '205, the last-in, first-out ("lifo"
method of inventory valuation, which moderates the effects or
profits of rapid changes in inventory values. The price deflation o
the 'sos increased the use of this method of inventory fificing ir
manufacturing, and the outbreak of World War II greatly acceler
ated its application, especially among large concerns.9 A
of trade concerns, while precluded by their inventory control meth
ods from a strict application of the last-in, first-out method of inven
tory pricing, have sought to obtain comparable results by
their closing inventory on the basis of a retail price index to a valu
approximating "normal or average" cost.'°
During World War I the financing of working capital require
ments of manufacturing and trade was chiefly by private enterpris
itself, through short-term credits from banks and trade sources. Jr
World War II these sources have again been important, but
credit and deferred tax payments, that is, tax accruals, have playec
a larger role than in the last war period. Whereas total loans anc
discounts of all banks increased 39 percent over the first three year:
9"Itis interesting to note the increasing use of the last-in, first-out method. With gen
erally increasing prices of materials, more and more people object to showing profit
and paying taxes on what, under the first-in, first-out method, is merely an increas
in the price level for the same inventory quantities and not a real profit."C. Olive
Wellington, "Financial Statements in Wartime," Journal of Accountancy (July
p.57.
10Seethe New York Sunday Times, June 27,1943, Section3, p. 6, in which closeti
iooretail concerns are credited with applying this method in filing their income ta:
returns for 1941-42.
i8World War I, they decreased by 7 percent over the equivalent
nod of World War H. Commercial and industrial loans have
en, as in the first war, but thus far they have been quite a small
:tor in the total wartime inflation of bank credit.
Cash balances of medium and small business concerns in manu-
:turing and trade increased about in proportion to demand de-
of banks during the war years 1915-18,whilethose of large
rporations increased somewhat more rapidly. In the early stages
World War II, cash balances of business concerns of all sizes
ew in rough proportion to demand deposits, but after late 1942
ey increased at a substantially greater rate." This reflects an
creased need for cash to meet the gteatly expanded volume of war-
ne disbursements; it also reflects, in many cases, the liquidation
inventory and receivables, the postponement of maintenance and
placement expenditures, the accumulation of reserve funds, the
crual of tax liabilities, and the failure to reinvest retained earn-
gs in other assets. The fact that the cash balance gains of manu-
:turing and trade enterprise during i915-18were not lost in the
mediate postwar years may have prophetic significance.
Progress payments and, in some industries, advances on war con-
tcts helped to meet working capital needs in World War I. the
oader scale of World War II, and the greater number of prime
d subcontractors, have magnified the problem of providing work-
capital aid to war production industries. To expedite the financ-
of subcontractors, and to alleviate the dependence of prime
ritractors upon contract advances and progress payments, com-
banks have been guaranteed since May 1942bythe Army,
Navy and the Maritime Commission against losses on loans to
contractors arising out of the cancellation of war contracts.
Lvances outstanding under loan agreements, guaranteed through
Reserve Banks as agents (under Regulation V of the Board of
wernors of the Federal Reserve System), amounted to about
e-tenth of total commercial and industrial loans of all insured
riks by the middle of 1943, and total loans authorized exceeded
e-third of total commercial and industrial loans outstanding. To
ee the results of the survey by the Federal Reserve System, "Ownership of Bank
)Osits," Federal Reserve Bulletin (October 1943)pp.917-22; also C. R. Whittlesey,
Effect of War on Currency and Deposits, National Bureau of Economic Research,
ancial Research Program, Occasional Paper ii(1943) pp.20-24.
19help meet the special financing needs of small business concerns
gaged in producing war materials or essential civilian goods, t
Smaller War Plants Corporation instituted in November,
repurchase plan for bank loans up to $25,000 extended to small-sc:
producers. Restrictions on consumer credit, and limitations on
ventory accumulation as a result of rationing, have operated to h(
down the expansion of working capital in trade, and hence h2
checked demands for short-term bank credit in this field.
Complete information on the total amounts that were invob
in contract cancellations at end of World War I is not availab
but it has been estimated that war agencies terminated appn
imately 32,000 separate contracts, with an aggregate uncomplet
value of aboutbillion.12In the neighborhood of 7,000 contra
remained unsettled one year after termination, of which about E
contracts were ultimately adjudicated through' United Sta
Court of Claims at an average time expenditure of three and oi
half years. On the basis of the production program of World War
it is estimated that the end of hostilities will witness cancellath
in excess of a hundred thousand contracts, having an uncomplel
value anywhere from $6o to billion, and involving' inventor
on hand of from $io to $15 billion.13 Sheer number of contra
and the magnitude of sums involved makes the problem of contr
termination after .World War II vastly more complicated than af
World War I. Many manufacturing companies, prime and si
contractors, face the possibility of having to finance postwar reci
version from .working capital, whose liquidity is dependent up
the fair and speedy settlement of war contracts when canceled
the close of hostilities.14
12 Report of the Research Committee, Committee for Economic Development, Posi
Employment and the Settlement of Terminated War Contracts (October 1943)
J.Donald Edwards, Termination of Ordnance Contracts, 1918,U.S. Bureau of
Statistics, Historical Study No. 57 (January '943); and Lieut. Col. Harold Sheph
Settlement of War Contracts, Army Ordnance Report No. 2, Army Ordnance Assc
tion (August g, '943).
13 Report of the Research Committee, Committee for Economic Development,
also M. R. Gainsbrugh and M. N. Struever, "Cancellation of War Contracts, W
War I," National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., The Conference Board Econc
Record (March• 1943)pp. and "The Settlement of War Contracts," Nati
City Ban/i Letter (March 1943) pp. 29-32.
14 The standard contract termination clause used by the War Department is discu
in Shepherd, op. cit.
20The war finance mechanism of World War I made no" advance
rovision for the impact of war contract termination; the World
Var II situation in this respect is strikingly different. To the extent
mt war contract inventory is covered by government purchase
)mmitments, the threat of partial freezing of corporate working
ipital during contract settlement is lessened. Moreover, where
rorking capitil heeds for war contracts have been financed with the
id of Regulation V loans, there are provisions for the automatic
Ktension of outstanding advances, upon cancellation of contracts,
ridforrelief from interest and principal repayments until settle-
ient of contracts.15 Finally, new regulations have been issued for
loans, called VT loans, under which guaranteed credits may be
)ctended with the object of freeing business working capital in the
vent of war contract termination in response to swiftly changing
'ar requirements, subject like Regulation V loans to the same auto-
latic relief from interest and principal repayments until settle-
ient of canceled war contracts.16 While Regulation V and VT loans.
rotect war contractors against the necessity of liquidating current
ebt suddenly, and thus• assure maintenance of postwar working
apital positions, there are some who feel that the contract termina-
on problem cannot be fully met in this way, and that some new
for settling war contracts quickly and equitably must be
rovided.17
Maintenance expenditures have necessarily been postponed by
riorities and material shortages, and this deferment has tended,
specially in -non-war enterprises, to inflates corporate profits sub-
to taxes —regardlessof any impairment of the productivity of
hysical plant that may affect the profitability of operations in the
ostwar period. Material shortages were less stringent during World
Var I, and thus profit inflation arising from postponed mainte-
The relation of Regulation V loans to contract cancellation is clearly shown in
oy A. Foulke, "Let's Tackle the First Post-War Problem Now," Dun's Review (May
)43) pp. 7 if.
'Effective September i,1943;see the Federal Reserve Bulletin (September 1943)
849-50.
Report of the Research Committee, Committee for Economic Development, cit.,
iwhichspecial legislation is recommended to create a contract settlement board with
road powers, to provide "loans" on unsettled contracts awaiting verification of claims,
establish a uniform formula for contract settlement, and to provide for expansion
legal machinery to expedite appeals of dissatisfied contractors.
21nance expenditures was probably a less important factor at
time in the financial experience of manufacturing and trade.
With regard to the taxation of corporate income in the two W2
periods, several factors are noteworthy:
First, the over-all tax burden was considerably lighter in the fir
war than at the present time —45percent of net income in 1918, th
year of heaviest taxes, as compared with a maximum effective ta
rate of 8o percent under the Revenue Act of 1942. Not only is di
total amount of the tax substantially larger at present, but also di
structure of corporate income taxes is different: in i 918 there was
12 percent normal tax, no surtax, and an 8o percent war and exce
profits tax; under the tax law of i 942 the combined normal and su:
tax is 40 percent and the excess profits tax 90 percent. This diffe:
ence in the structure of tax rates means that a smaller component (
the total annual tax assessment is considered an abnormal wartim
levy, while a larger component is regarded as a normal, continuin
charge against annual earnings. Business expectations as to possib]
postwar reductions in corporate taxes must take this fact into a
count.
Second, as an incentive to expansion of industrial capacity, co
porations in World War I were allowed to accelerate depreciatio
on specially constructed war plant and facilities. However,ti-i
amount of accelerated depreciation was left to be determined, und
normal peaèetime conditions, so that tax relief was only realized i
the early '20s when economic obsolescence could be establishe
in conformity with tax laws. In World War II, concerns expandiri
plant and facilities under emergency conditions have been pe
mitted to costs of expansion over a period (c
less, if the emergency ended sooner), provided these facilities ha
been certified as necessary for national defense or purposes.
Immediate tax relief by virtue of accelerated depreciation has thi
been available currently on the basis of proper certification by tF
contracting government agency. The prospect that postwar ta
rates may be lower has been the principal incentive for taking ai
vantage of accelerated depreciation on privately constructed
18 Effective June 10,1940 throughOctober 5, 1943. An illuminating account of ti
role of accelerated depreciation in World Wars I and II is given by E. Cary Brov
and Gardner Patterson, "Accelerated Depreciation, A Neglected Chapter in W
Taxation," Quarterly Journal' of Economics (August 1943)pp.630-45.
22ints. Over $5.5 billion worth of private investment in World War
facilities has been certified for accelerated depreciation, against
Dund $700millionworth of facilities so amortized under World
ar I tax law.
Third, in view of the high level of taxes attained in World War
the government has assumed some responsibility for providing
Lsiness with funds from which to meet postwar conversion and
justment expenses. The Revenue Act of 1942 allows a postwar
edit amounting to io percent of excess profits taxes, with a pro-
that corporations retiring debt may under certain conditions
all themselves of this credit immediately.
Fourth, as a result of the carry-back provision applicable to net
'erating losses, a corporation whose deferred maintenance and re-
justment expenditures are so large as to result in postwar operat-
losses is entitled to apply these losses against earnings of the two
ececling years, and to claim a refund of taxes paid; in like manner
may carry any remaining loss balance forward as an offset to suc-
years' profits. There is a similar provision with respect to
Lused excess profits tax credits, and a carry-forward provision ap-
ving to capital losses, both of which may be expected to influence
stwar replacement and reconversion decisions. The contribution
these provisions may prove very great, but their efficacy remains
be tested.
In the period of World War I larger companies established re-
yes for possible postwar contingencies and future declines in the
trket value of inventory, but the amount of such reserves was in
)st cases relatively small. The experience of the last war, and the
gress made by accountants in evaluating economic conditions,
ye, in the present war, led a much larger number of companies
set up such reserves and to make substantial allocations to them.
te American Institute of Accountants took early recognition of
problem, and in January 1942 its committee on accounting pro-
lure issued a bulletin recommending to corporate management
I accountants the principles to be followed in accounting for
,cial reserves arising out of the war.'° A recent survey, based on
fiscal reports of 429 large companies in 15 trade and
nufacturing industry groups, reveals that about one-fifth of the
merican Institute of Accountants, Accounting for Special Reserves Arising Out o/
War, Aécounting Research Bulletin No. ig(January1942).
23companies had established contingency reserves of one type or
other for such postwar purposes as; reconversion of plant and fa
ties; deferred maintenance and repairs; dismissal compensati
and inventory revaluation.20 Tabulations of corporate annual
ports for 1942showa considerable increase in the proportion
companies providing postwar reserves by charges against earned
come or by earmarking other reserves. In contrast to World Wa
experience, the sums involved in such reserves were in most a
substantial.2'
The likenesses and differences between financing tendencies
Wars 1 and II, as observed at this stage of the second conS
provoke conjectureregarding the future. It is clear that some of
differences arise from the larger scale of the present war effort, a
that some of them grow out of the financial lessons learned
the first war and in the intervening years. It remains to be s
whether from now on the resemblances will increase or dimini
The war and postwar record of the World War I period,
not an infallible guide, is certainly suggestive of problems that n
have to be met, and of experiences that may have to be avoid
20Thesurvey was conducted by the Research Department of the American Instii
of Accountants. See Journal of Accountancy (August 1942)pp. and(Noven
1943)pp.391-408.
21Thequestion of postwar reserves is treated at some length in Mark S. Ma;
Business Reserves for Postwar Survivat, National Planning Association, Plant
Pamphlets Nos. 19-20(April1943).
24